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Abstract: Entering the twenty-first century, China has been the site of many 
serious environmental disasters and accidents. These have strengthened the 
call for the establishment of an environmental risk management system and 
for the development of new policies to effectively manage risk. Among the 
new policies in China’s environmental risk management strategy are pollution 
insurance and information disclosure. This paper explores information disclo-
sure policies through the implementation of the Environmental Information 
Disclosure Decree by governmental authorities and companies. In both 2008 
and 2010, we reviewed the websites of the Ministry of Environmental Protec-
tion and all 31 provincial Environmental Protection Bureaus, conducted ex-
periments in requesting information disclosure, and held interviews with all 
provincial Environmental Protection Bureaus. We conclude that the imple-
mentation of the Environmental Information Disclosure Decree is improving 
but still far from widespread, full and effective. The lack of enforcement and 
the ambiguity of some clauses in the decree give provincial environmental 
agencies great discretion to avoid disclosure and discourages enforcement of 
company environmental information disclosure. Implementation shortcom-
ings of the decree are also related to the longstanding closeness, secrecy and 
monopoly of information in China’s political system. 
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Environmental Risk Management in China 
China started to work more systematically on managing environmental 
risks in the 1990s. Since then, different policies and regulations have 
been issued and implemented at different governmental levels to control 
environmental risks, such as the “Technical Guidelines for Environmen-
tal Impact Assessment, General Programme” (1993, HJ/T2.1-93), “Pes-
ticide Management Regulations” (1997, updated in 2001) and “Audit 
Standard for Occupational Safety and Health Management System” 
(2001). Most of the twentieth-century environmental policies in China 
have focused on common pollution control problems, and very few have 
been effective in environmental risk management.  
Entering the twenty-first century, China has been the site of a series 
of serious environmental disasters and accidents, which promoted the 
awareness and understanding of both the Chinese government and the 
Chinese public about environmental risks. The chemical spill in the 
Songhuajiang River in 2005 was notorious, but it is certainly not unique; 
135 cases of emergent environmental incidents were reported directly to 
the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) in 2008 alone. The 
Chinese government accelerated the development of environmental risk 
management policies and established a sound environmental risk man-
agement system. Such an environmental risk management system in 
China consists of two parts: 1) The environmental risk response system 
focuses on how to act upon and cope with environmental accidents. 2) 
Environmental risk prevention and mitigation focuses on preventing 
such risks from emerging and thus harming humans and the environ-
ment (see Figure 1). 
The environmental risk response system is formed by the Emergen-
cy Response Law (ERL, 2007) and Emergency Response Plans (ERPs), 
which prepare governments and industries for coping with risks by out-
lining how to act in the face of different kinds of accidents. ERPs are 
classified into four levels: national, departmental, local (provincial, mu-
nicipal and county) and organizational. Although ERPs are not specifi-
cally made for environmental disasters, environmental pollution acci-
dents are usually one of the most important categories in those plans. 
When applying emergency response plans, environmental accidents are 
graded with four scales according to casualties, economic damage, social 
impacts, etc., with Grade I being the most severe. Although the envir-
onmental risk response system is more or less systematically built and 
looks comprehensive, the policies and systems working on environmen-
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tal risk precaution and mitigation are still limited and fragmented. Those 
policies come from different governmental departments and focus on 
various kinds of environmental risks.  
Figure 1: Policy System on Environmental Risk Management in China  
 
Source: Authors’ own compilation. 
Recently, some innovative policies have been added to China’s environ-
mental risk management system, focusing both on emergency response 
and prevention and mitigation. These innovations aim to strengthen 
environmental risk management by involving and empowering non-state 
actors in risk governance. Pollution insurance and information disclosure 
are two recent examples of such innovations. 
Environmental pollution liability insurance (or, “pollution insur-
ance”) is a newly proposed market-based approach to controlling envir-
onmental risks in China. The MEP initiated the idea of imposing manda-
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tory pollution insurance on polluting industries, a practice also undertak-
en in other countries. Pollution insurance had already been introduced in 
some Chinese cities at the beginning of the 1990s, but it failed at that 
time and was abandoned in China just a few years later, in the the mid-
1990s. Pollution insurance policy was again put into trial use in 2006 in 
the coal industry. The policy is still under discussion, and there are far-
reaching plans to further test and introduce it in different industries and 
provinces in order to gain further experience with it, improve the system, 
and fully implement it in 2015 (Tremblay 2008). Pollution insurance is a 
type of insurance that covers costs related to pollution, which may in-
clude the costs of brownfield restoration and cleanup, and liability for 
injuries and deaths caused by pollution. One of the purposes of this 
insurance policy is that when companies that cause environmental disas-
ters go bankrupt, the victims can still be compensated. The major na-
tional insurance company Pin An, which formally launched its environ-
mental pollution liability insurance in 2009, has already compensated 
victims of environmental pollution from this insurance arrangement. But 
arguably more important will be the preventive nature of such insurance 
arrangements for environmental risks, as the private insurance sector will 
become a co-governor of hazardous industries and will enforce imple-
mentation of risk prevention and mitigation policies and measures (Bal-
mer and Hendry 2009). 
Information disclosure forms a second innovation in environmental 
risk management. As we will elaborate on in the next section, infor-
mation disclosure calls upon new actors and new steering mechanisms in 
managing environmental risks. Mandatory disclosure of information on 
environmental risks will further trigger polluters and environmental au-
thorities to reduce risks through public pressure. In China, the important 
role of information, information availability and information disclosure 
in managing environmental risks has been increasingly recognized in a 
variety of recent legislations and policies, such as the Work Safety Law of 
the People’s Republic of China (2002), the Regulations on the Control 
over Safety of Dangerous Chemicals (2011), and the National Catalogue 
of Dangerous Substances (GB12268). Also in the Opinion on Strength-
ening Environmental Emergency Response Management (No. 130 of 
2009), the MEP recognized the large gap between the demand for effec-
tive risk management and the actual capacity of government and industry 
to meet that demand. Hence, the MEP has set targets for 2015 to, 
among other things, establish a database of sources of environmental 
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risk of major economic sectors and create an information-based profes-
sional environmental risk management system (He et al. 2011a, 2011b). 
But the relevance of public availability and disclosure of information on 
environmental risks in managing these risks has been especially empha-
sized as part of the wider Open Government Information Regulation 
(OGIR), which was issued in 2007 by the State Council in order to open 
up access to government information and ensure greater official trans-
parency nationwide. As the MEP had experimented before 2007 with 
disclosure of company environmental information to reduce environ-
mental risks, the MEP was the first ministry to operationalize these gen-
eral regulations into the Environmental Information Disclosure Decree 
(EIDD). The EIDD has been in effect since 1 May 2008. It forces low-
er-level governmental authorities and serious industrial polluters to dis-
close environmental information to the public, making the public a more 
active actor in managing environmental risks. The implementation of 
this decree is expected to speed up the transition from conventional 
government-dominated environmental regulation to a more transparent 
and “modern” environmental governance system in China.  
This paper will explore in particular the implementation of envir-
onmental information disclosure by governmental authorities and com-
panies following the EIDD. The next section provides some background 
on what has become known as informational regulation or informational 
governance (see Mol 2006), where information disclosure is understood 
as a new mode of governing industries to prevent environmental risks. 
The subsequent section reports on the information disclosure policies 
and institutions in China. The sections thereafter provide an assessment 
of recent practices and performance of environmental information dis-
closure policies in China. 
Information Disclosure as Environmental  
Governance 
Initiatives on right-to-know and mandatory disclosure of environmental 
information have been growing since the early days of modern environ-
mentalism. Because of the specificities of its political system, information 
disclosure programmes and right-to-know legislation emerged first – and 
are arguably still most advanced – in the United States (Graham and 
Miller 2001; Guttman 2008; Jobe 1999). There, most current environ-
mental laws include right-to-know provisions – most notably, of course, 
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the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986. 
This federal law was a congressional reaction to a number of incidents, 
most notably the 1984 Union Carbide incident in Bhopal, India, in which 
2,000 people were killed. But this law has become part of a much broad-
er set of right-to-know activities, protests, pressures and legal codes in 
many countries. In general, European countries followed the US; within 
Europe, the Nordic countries and the Netherlands in particular were 
clearly ahead of countries such as the United Kingdom, Germany, 
France, other Mediterranean countries, and Central and Eastern Europe-
an states in this regard (Chen 2008; Mol 2008).  
The call for further public access to environmental information col-
lected by polluters and state agencies got a new – now international – 
impetus following Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration, agreed upon at 
the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED) in 1992. On the European continent, this resulted in the År-
hus Convention in 1997, whereas globally the Access Initiative and the 
Partnership for Principle 10 continuously kept access to and disclosure 
of information on the global political agenda. The 2003 Kiev Protocol 
under the Århus Convention further enhanced public access to infor-
mation in Europe through promoting the establishment of coherent, 
nationwide Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers (PRTRs). By 2000, 
44 countries had passed access-to-information legislation (World Bank 
2002), and by 2006, almost 70 countries had done so (Banisar 2006). 
According to a World Resource Institute Report (Petkova, Maurer, and 
Henninger 2002), three main forces have triggered the growing world-
wide demand for public access to environmental information: (1) the 
urgency and scope of environmental problems, which caused wide sup-
port for information-sharing; (2) the increase in activism in civil society, 
not limited to the OECD countries; and (3) the developments in (and 
spread of) information technology and means of communication. 
Initially, these right-to-know and mandatory disclosure legislations 
and ideas were not related to environmental improvements and reform. 
The basic motive was simply related to ideas of democracy and transpar-
ency: Citizens have a democratic right to access information, and for 
that, information needs to be disclosed publicly. It was only in the mid-
1990s that information disclosure, right-to-know, and environmental 
reporting obligations were interpreted as having positive environmental 
governance effects (Kakkainen 2001; Stewart 2001; Mol 2006). In the 
legal, economic and sociological literature, the influence of the wider 
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availability of environmental information on environmental regulation, 
policy-making and management has been referred to as informational 
regulation or informational governance (Konar and Cohen 1997; Tieten-
berg 1998; Kleindorfer and Orts 1999; Case 2001; Mol 2006, 2008). With 
informational regulation or governance, conventional regulatory prac-
tices of states such as standard-setting, licensing and enforcement are 
complemented or partly replaced by new informational dynamics in 
which state as well as non-state actors play a significant role: “regulation 
by revelation” (Tietenberg and Wheeler 1998; Florini 2003; van den Burg 
2006). 
Under conditions of informational regulation/ governance, new 
monitoring systems and mechanisms along with mandatory disclosure 
trigger new enforcement dynamics (Wheeler 1997; Kakkainen 2001). 
Information disclosure to the public is then seen as an effective en-
forcement mechanism that complements and supports classical en-
forcement via the state. Widely publicized environmental information 
assists conventional enforcement activities, as polluters attempt to pre-
vent receiving such negative publicity to ward off consequences for their 
reputation and markets. According to Graham (2002), mandatory disclo-
sure strategies differ in three ways from conventional governmental poli-
cies on the environment: First, these strategies influence environmental 
risk levels not through legislative or regulatory processes by the state but 
through non-state public and market pressure, or the mere threat of such 
pressure. Second, the “regulators” are not only governments but also the 
countless actions of numerous non-state actors that are empowered by 
knowledge and information to change purchasing, investments, voting, 
collective actions, and so on. Third, these systems extend beyond the 
reach of the government and even beyond national boundaries. 
Although in most OECD countries access to environmental infor-
mation has been institutionally safeguarded and is increasingly widely 
available, the debate on its necessity and prospects has not lost its urgen-
cy, for three reasons. First, many of the non-OECD countries have still 
not (fully) installed legal provisions and institutionalized practices for 
freedom of information and information disclosure. Only recently have 
Asian countries started to develop and implement right-to-know and 
information disclosure laws and provisions in environmental policies and 
governance (Afsah, Laplante, and Wheeler 1997; Guo 2008). Transitional 
economies in Asia such as those of Vietnam, China and Laos have been 
notably slow in setting up advanced systems of information disclosure 
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(Mol 2009a). Second, the implementation of access to environmental 
information and the ease of access to environmental information still 
seriously lags behind the legal codification (Petkova, Maurer, and Hen-
ninger 2002; Stephan 2002; Kerret and Gray 2007). Third, the possible 
side effects of these environmental disclosure systems have started to 
emerge on the research agenda (Mol 2010). 
China’s Environmental Information Disclosure 
Decree 
China’s efforts to legislate information disclosure date back to 1999, 
when a specific research institute was established within the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences to carry out research on the legislation of 
making government information open to the public. In May 2002, the 
State Council entrusted this institute to draft the information disclosure 
regulations, and a first draft was made in July 2002. But it took till 2006 
before the draft regulations and the explanations were submitted to the 
State Council and were listed in their legislation planning. The Opening 
Governmental Information Regulation (OGIR) was approved in January 
2007 and came into effect on 1 May 2008. The main motivations behind 
the OGIR are to alleviate the information asymmetry between actors; to 
gain political credit by “improving the transparency of governmental 
work”; and to improve administrative performance (Wang, Greer, and 
Lin 2008; Zheng 2007). The regulations also stipulate exemptions for 
disclosure: Article 14 reads “No administrative organ may disclose any 
government information involving state secrets, commercial secrets or 
individual privacy” and is in line with most exemptions in other coun-
tries; but Article 8 adds that government information disclosure should 
not endanger the “national security, public security, economic security or 
social stability”, a much wider interpretation.  
The EIDD is the first sectoral system to operationalize the general 
OGIR regulations. The EIDD should be understood within the context 
of a wider system of information disclosure that has been developing in 
China. Since the turn of the millennium, China has witnessed increasing 
openness of, publication of, and public access to environmental infor-
mation (Li and Xiong 2005; Yue, Chen, and Lu 2007). The 2004 Cleaner 
Production Promotion Law has been instrumental in informational gov-
ernance, as it enables the MEP and local Environmental Protection Bu-
reaus (EPBs) to publish environmental data of non-complying compa-
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nies in newspapers or on websites (Mol and Liu 2005). Many provinces 
use the 2004 Cleaner Production Promotion Law to force non-
complying companies to publish emissions data (using Article 31), and 
EPBs have publicly criticized poorly performing enterprises (based on 
Article 17) (Guo 2005: 7-8). The predecessor of the MEP also issued 
regulations in 2003 on environmental inspection and public disclosure of 
environmental performance for companies accessing – or refinancing on 
– the stock market. But we can also witness increasing public access to 
environmental information on a larger scale – for instance, in growing 
newspaper reporting and publication of environmental quality data and 
risks; increasing quantities and qualities of environmental websites (e.g. 
in all major cities and also on the websites  of NGOs); information dis-
closure experiments with industries such as the GreenWatch programme 
and a nation- and province-wide company rating programme (Cao et al. 
2010; Dong et al. 2010; Shang, Liu, and Geng 2007; Wang, Bi, and 
Wheeler 2002; Wang et al. 2002); the development of an environmental 
auditing system; and the start of a web-based pollutant emission and 
transfer register (by the Institute of Public & Environmental Affairs; see 
Mol 2009b: 98). The EIDD strengthens and institutionalizes these vari-
ous efforts of both environmental authorities and various non-
governmental actors to promote information disclosure and public par-
ticipation. 
This decree requires not only environmental authorities but also in-
dustries to disclose environmental information. In the decree, environ-
mental information is clustered into four major categories: environmen-
tal laws and regulations; environmental quality; environmental manage-
ment and supervision; and environmental accidents and emergency re-
sponses. These four categories are again broken down into 17 items 
(Table 1). For example, the first category covers items such as environ-
mental laws, regulations, standards, administrative permits and approval. 
For provincial EPBs, it is compulsory to disclose information on all 17 
items. Those industries that discharge above emission standards (labelled 
“serious polluting enterprises”) must publish without any exemption 
information on four categories: the company’s name and address and the 
name of its legal representative; the concentration and volume of each 
pollutant and its discharge mode; the environmental facilities in opera-
tion; and the company’s emergency response plan. Other industries are 
encouraged to report this environmental information on a voluntary 
basis. The decree also specifies how and within what time frame envir-
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onmental information should be provided to the public: Environmental 
authorities must make information available to the public within 20 
working days; responses to requests for information from the public 
should be answered within 15 working days; and major industrial pollut-
ers (as registered by EPBs) must disclose and report emissions data with-
in 30 days. In addition, the decree requires the establishment of monitor-
ing, evaluation and supervision systems. Those organizations violating 
the rules of information disclosure will be held responsible and account-
able by their higher-level supervisors; industries violating the rules will 
face penalties. Citizens can sue public authorities and industries that 
violate the decree. Yan Yiming, a lawyer from Shanghai, was the first to 
make use of the EIDD by requesting the EPBs of Anhui and Henan 
provinces to disclose environmental information on 4 and 5 May 2008, 
respectively (East Today 2008). 
Table 1: Environmental Information for Mandatory Disclosure as Specified in 
EIDD  
Category Items 
Category I  
Environmental 
laws and regula-
tions 
Environmental laws, regulations, standards and policy papers 
 The items, legal basis, standards and procedures of environmen-
tal administrative fees 
 The items, legal basis, standards and procedures of pollution 
discharge fees 
 The structures, function and contact information of environ-
mental agencies 
 Other environmental information for mandatory disclosure 
according to other laws and regulations 
Category II 
Environmental 
quality 
Environmental quality statement 
 Environmental statistics and survey data 
 The types, volumes and disposal of solid waste in large and 
medium-sized cities 
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Category Items 
Category II 
Environmental 
quality 
List of key polluters whose pollution emissions are above the 
national or local discharge standards, or above total pollution 
volume control quota 
Category III 
Environmental 
management and 
supervision 
Environmental protection planning 
 The Environmental Impact Assessment documents for con-
struction projects and their results; the items, legal basis, re-
quirements, procedures and results of other environmental 
administrative permits 
 Responses to and decisions on complaints about industrial 
pollution cases 
 The breakdown of the total pollution volume of major pollu-
tants and their enforcement; the issuing of emissions permits; 
the results of quantitative examination of urban environment.  
 The enforcement and result of environmental administrative 
penalties, administrative reviews and administrative measures 
 Approval of environmental protection pilot projects 
Category IV  
Environmental 
accidents and 
emergency re-
sponse 
The emergency response plan; alarms on and response to envi-
ronmental accidents  
 List of industries that have caused major environmental pollu-
tion accidents; list of industries that refuse to execute adminis-
trative penalty decisions 
Source: Authors’ own compilation. 
The exemptions formulated in the general OGIR also apply to this envir-
onmental decree (Wang and Cui 2008). This opens the possibility for 
strategic use of the category “sensitive information”, by incorrectly refus-
ing to answer public information requests. In general, governmental 
officials are still used to working behind closed doors and – according to 
one commentator – this decree might change doors into “transparent 
doors”, but may not open them (Renmin Ribao 2008).  
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Assessing Information Disclosure: Methodology 
In assessing the implementation of the new environmental information 
disclosure system, we focused on the role of provincial Environmental 
Protection Bureaus and on major corporations. Provincial EPBs play a 
key role in implementing this decree; they are under the direct super-
vision of the MEP and are responsible for supervising lower-level EPBs. 
In our assessment, we included all 31 provincial-level EPBs, as well as 
the MEP. We assessed the information disclosure performance of EPBs 
and the MEP in November 2008 (six months after the EIDD came into 
effect) and again in June 2010 (two years after the EIDD came into ef-
fect), using the same methodology. Provincial EPBs should provide 
environmental information on major industrial polluters, but we also 
assessed company environmental information disclosures separately.  
To assess to what extent these EPBs had implemented the EIDD, 
three different methods were applied in 2008 (see also Zhang et al. 2010) 
and were repeated in 2010. Firstly, a standardized analysis was performed 
on the websites of the MEP and all 31 provincial EPBs regarding the 
requirements set out in the decree. As specified in the MEP Guidelines 
on Environmental Information Disclosure (Article 1.2), mandatory dis-
closed environmental information must be made available on the EPB 
website, and the website should also provide information on the proce-
dure and requirements for information requests. These websites were 
assessed simultaneously but independently by ten academic experts in 
environmental information handling (all frequent users of governmental 
websites) in 2008 and again in 2010. The experts were given standardized 
instructions on scoring the websites on a five-point Likert scale, from 
“1” (insufficient/ none) to “5” (complete), regarding the following three 
aspects: 
 User friendliness of the website interface: (i) Is there a direct and 
easy-to-find clickable link on the EPB website for environmental in-
formation that has to be disclosed? (ii) If not, are environmental in-
formation and the forms and procedures to ask for additional envir-
onmental information reachable via the provincial governmental 
website on general information disclosure (indirect link)? (iii) Are 
the items for environmental information disclosure directly linked to 
full texts, data archives, etc.? 
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 Convenience of information disclosure for society: How convenient 
is it for individuals or organizations to request environmental in-
formation from EPBs?  
 Coverage of mandatory information: What percentage of the 4 cate-
gories and 17 items (see Table 1) of environmental information, as 
specified in the MEP Guidelines on Environmental Information 
Disclosure, is actually included in the EPB websites? (Note: The ac-
curacy of the provided information goes beyond the scope of this 
study.) 
Secondly, we carried out an experiment on how provincial EPBs reacted 
to requests for environmental information. As a research centre of the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences, we formally submitted a request to all 
EPBs for a list of key chemical industrial polluters (including their loca-
tions, sizes and emission discharges) and for the 2005–2007 records 
(2008 survey) or the 2005–2009 records (2010 survey) of major envir-
onmental accidents in the province. According to the guidelines, this 
information falls under mandatory disclosure but does not have to be 
presented directly on websites. Applications for these information re-
quests were submitted using the provincial contact information provided 
on the websites, or via a telephone call in case no information was avail-
able on the websites. After 15 working days, we re-contacted those EPBs 
that did not respond in order to resubmit our request and to explore 
reasons for their initial failure.  
Thirdly, the officers responsible for environmental information dis-
closure of the MEP and all 31 provincial EPBs were interviewed on the 
implementation of actual requests for environmental information disclo-
sure using a semi-open, standardized questionnaire. Questions related to 
 reasons for (not) providing requested environmental information;  
 preparatory work done before 1 May 2008, and difficulties encoun-
tered in these preparations; 
 the number of requests for environmental information disclosure 
received since 1 May 2008, and the kind of applicants; and 
 reasons for failure(s) to disclose environmental information. 
In addition to this assessment of EPBs, we also analysed how companies 
reacted to ongoing calls for information disclosure and the EIDD. Here 
we used a review of existing studies, data and media reporting to gain an 
overview of company environmental information disclosure. 
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Implementing Information Disclosure  
Requirements by EPBs 
In preparing for the implementation of the national EIDD and following 
the requirements of the MEP, the number of provincial EPBs that for-
mulated their own specific guidelines for information disclosure in-
creased from 21 in 2008 to 30 by June 2010, with Tibet as the only prov-
ince failing to do so up till June 2010. For most of the 30 provincial 
EPBs, these guidelines are not much more than an exact copy of the 
relevant articles and catalogue of the national decree. In addition, the 
EPBs sometimes had limited personnel and financial capacity for imple-
mentation, and often added the task of implementation to an existing 
division without providing additional resources and capacity for imple-
mentation.   
The 2010 review of the provincial EPBs’ websites proved that, ex-
cept for Tibet, all 30 websites have a direct clickable link to the item of 
information disclosure, while this was the case for only 21 provincial 
EPBs in 2008. On 27 (16 in 2008) of the 30 websites, one can click on 
the title of listed documents to obtain the full text of regulations or poli-
cy documents, while three websites (Hebei, Hunan and Xinjiang) present 
only a list of items falling under the disclosure decree, without having 
direct access.  
Ten experts were independently asked to score the convenience of 
the websites using a five-point Likert scale (“1” inconvenient – “5” very 
convenient). The average scores are provided in Figures 2 and 3 for 2008 
and 2010 respectively, showing a large variety among the EPB websites. 
In terms of the coverage of the contents as specified in the MEP Guide-
lines on Environmental Information Disclosure, the experts rated the 
information availability (but not the information quality) of the 17 items 
within the four categories of information (see Table 1): environmental 
laws and regulations; environmental quality; environmental management 
and supervision; and environmental accidents and emergency responses. 
Again, a 5-point Likert scale was used, ranging from “5” (full coverage of 
the 17 items) to “1” (no coverage of the 17 items). The Tibet EPB had 
no specific website until June 2010. Except for Tibet (which did have 
some information on the general provincial website, but no EPB 
webpage), all other EPB websites provide some information: In 2010, 18 
websites scored on average “5”, eight websites scored on average “4”, 
and for four websites the average score was “3”. Five of the 31 EPBs 
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give no information on environmental accidents and emergency re-
sponses. Compared with the results of the 2008 survey, the number of 
websites with scores of “5” increased by two, and the number of EPBs 
that gave no information on environmental accidents and emergency 
responses halved, indicating some improvement.  
Figure 2: Convenience and Coverage of Items of MEP and 31 EPB Websites 
in November 2008 
 
Source: Authors’ own compilation. 
Figure 3: Convenience and Coverage of Items of MEP and 31 EPB Websites 
in June 2010 
 
Source: Authors’ own compilation. 
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The 2010 survey showed that, of all provincial EPB websites, 21 offered 
online application forms for disclosure of environmental information, as 
does the website of the MEP. However, only 15 EPBs had well-
functioning online application systems while the other six did not work. 
These 21 agencies also offered other ways to send in information re-
quests (e.g. via mail, e-mail, fax and/ or telephone). Some of the other 
EPBs are more restricted in the ways they accept information requests. 
All EPBs and the MEP allow both individuals and organizations to send 
in information disclosure requests.  
We used the possibility for filing information disclosure requests to 
design an experiment on information disclosure. As an institute of the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences, we filed an information request on key 
chemical industrial polluters and on environmental accidents. Of the 32 
organizations (including the MEP), 16 EPBs and the MEP responded 
within the specified legal deadline of 15 working days in 2010. Of those, 
11 EPBs provided adequate information on the emissions data of large 
chemical industries and major environmental accidents since 2005, and 
five EPBs and the MEP explained why they could not provide the re-
quested information in time and requested an extension to process our 
application (see Figure 4). The other 15 EPBs did not react within 15 
working days. After 30 days, the situation improved a little, with two 
additional organizations (the MEP and one EPB) providing information. 
Nevertheless, this shows a noticeable improvement compared to the 
response in 2008, when only six EPBs provided adequate information 
within 30 days.  
In interviews with all EPBs and the MEP, a considerable number of 
them used secrecy of data, state security, social stability, confidentiality or 
similar arguments as excuses for their inability to provide the infor-
mation. Some EPB staff made it clear that their leaders would not like to 
provide the information. Sometimes they referred to Article 10 of the 
OGIR, sometimes to MEP Policy Paper 187, 2004, sometimes to the 
specific type of information requested (company information and key 
environmental accidents being confidential), and once, an EPB repre-
sentative asked questions about the identity and qualifications of the 
applicant (an academic institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences) 
and for what purpose it would need the information. Few claimed that 
this information could not be obtained due to poor provincial monitor-
ing systems, or poor technical and supporting facilities to produce data.  
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Figure 4: Response Rates of 31 EPBs Following Information Request in 2008 
and 2010 (including MEP) 
 
Source: Authors’ own compilation. 
Figure 5 provides a frequency graph on the number of requests for in-
formation “recorded” by EPBs from May to December 2008 and over 
the entire year 2009. In all provinces, individuals as well as organizations 
are entitled to file requests for environmental information disclosure, but 
only in a few provinces have individuals and organizations done so. The 
Shanghai EPB seems to have the best practice on information disclosure. 
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per cent from organizations. The MEP received 68 requests in 2008 and 
72 in 2009, about 90 per cent coming from individuals (see also MEP 
2009, 2010). The Henan EPB, the Beijing EPB, the Jiangsu EPB, the 
Guanxi EPB and the Anhui EPB also received considerable numbers of 
requests, mostly from individuals. For eight EPBs this experiment was 
the first request for environmental information they received in 2008, 
and for five EPBs the experiment was also the first request they received 
in 2009. The Guangdong EPB was reachable by neither phone nor fax 
for data in 2008 and 2009, and the Hebei EPB was not reachable for 
2008 data. Quite a number of EPBs promised in both 2008 and 2009 to 
answer later but failed to do so even after follow-up requests. This ex-
periment also illustrated that in 2008 hardly any EPB accurately regis-
tered environmental information requests they received. Most EPBs had 
to estimate the number of requests or needed a considerable amount of 
time before being able to provide an answer; three EPBs were even un-
able to provide an estimate. However, registering information requests 
seemed to have improved somewhat in 2009. Obviously, registering 
information disclosure requests is slowly becoming institutionalized 
within EPBs.  
Figure 5: Number of Requests for Information Recorded at all 31 EPBs and 
MEP 
 
Source: Authors’ own compilation. 
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In our interviews, shortcomings in capacity, capacity-building and train-
ing of provincial staff, unclear procedures and responsibilities, and lack 
of environmental information were often mentioned by EPBs as main 
reasons for their poor implementation of the Environmental Infor-
mation Disclosure Decree. Often, tasks related to the decree had been 
added to an existing division, without additional allocation of capacity or 
resources. Hence, the EPB divisions responsible for the implementation 
of the decree lacked hardware (technologies and information systems), 
staff and electronic “software”, as well as finances. A number of EPBs 
also mentioned the ambiguity of the guidelines and rules, for instance on 
responsibilities and procedures, which caused significant confusion in 
practice. And the poor quality of (existing) provincial monitoring sys-
tems, which were unable to generate the required information, were 
more than incidentally referred to. Existing data often need further pro-
cessing and analysis before these can be used and meet the needs of 
applicants. EPBs often lack the knowledge and capacity to do so. There 
is also no exchange of experiences between EPBs on how to interpret 
and operationalize the decree and the provincial guidelines, or on how to 
set up efficient information disclosure systems.  
These results are comparable with the outcomes of an earlier inves-
tigation. As part of the nationwide programme for information capacity-
building of government agencies (or, the “e-government” movement), 
the MEP entrusted its Information Centre to evaluate the performance 
of all provincial EPB websites in December 2007, half a year before the 
decree came into effect (MEP 2008). Only the Tibet EPB was excluded. 
Expert judgement was used as the main method to assess website design, 
public participation, environmental information provision, and online 
interaction functions. The MEP’s conclusions on active and passive 
information provision are not too different from our November 2008 
and June 2010 findings: Most of the websites presented relatively ade-
quate information on policy documents, basic environmental quality, 
environmental news and announcements, and the environmental agency 
itself. But most provincial websites fell short of providing environmental 
information on pollution control, environmental standards, Environ-
mental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedures and approvals, environ-
mental emissions and monitoring data, environmental accidents and 
emergency responses, and environmental fees and fines. EPBs tend to 
release easily obtainable and less sensitive information, but keep complex 
and “sensitive” information – such as on environmental supervision, 
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emissions data, EIA outcomes, accidents and emergency responses – 
veiled.  
Environmental Information Disclosure by  
Companies 
The MEP has advocated for company environmental information disclo-
sure with growing intensity since the turn of the millennium. The EIDD 
is only one of a set of policy efforts to increase public availability of 
company environmental data. In early 2007, the MEP published a 237-
page list of more than 6,000 industrial polluters on its website, requiring 
them to install automatic monitoring and control systems that are direct-
ly connected to local EPBs, and planning for disclosure of this collected 
data. There are various forms of non-mandatory environmental report-
ing and information disclosure by companies in China – for instance, 
reporting related to ISO14000 certification (Mol 2009a: 121), company 
sustainability reporting (<www.SustainabilityReport.cn>), corporate 
social responsibility reporting (following the 2008 CSR guidelines of the 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission), and voluntary 
environmental reporting; all of these are increasing rapidly. Various stud-
ies have found that this company environmental reporting performs 
poorly with respect to disclosing environmental data and information. 
Shang, Liu, and Geng (2007) reviewed annual reports of 127 listed com-
panies from 1992 to 2002 and concluded that the environmental infor-
mation they provided was very general and limited. A 2006 survey of 
environmental information disclosure of China’s top 500 companies 
showed that only 15 per cent of them disclosed any detailed environ-
mental information. On top of that, this information hardly included up-
to-date quantitative data (for example, on emissions); the data were also 
incomplete, did not provide year-to-year comparisons, and contained 
only information favourable to companies (Wu, Zhang, and Lin 2008). 
In another study, Liu and Anbumozhi (2009) analysed 175 major com-
panies listed by the China Securities Regulatory Commission regarding 
their environmental information disclosure performance, finding that 
less than 20 per cent of them had descriptive environmental information, 
and only a handful voluntarily disclosed detailed quantitative information 
(Petro China, for instance). Note that in all these information disclosure 
assessments only the major companies were included, and these compa-
nies can be expected to be front-runners in environmental reporting and 
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disclosure. A more representative sample of Chinese industries would 
show even bleaker results on environmental information disclosure. 
The above studies were carried out before the EIDD came into ef-
fect. In 2009 Greenpeace (2009) investigated to what extent mandatory 
corporate information disclosure, as stipulated in the EIDD, was imple-
mented during the first year. Of the 500 Fortune Global and the 100 
Fortune China companies, 18 companies (with 25 factories) were report-
ed by local EPBs to be in violation of regulations on pollution discharge 
standards. Hence, following the EIDD these companies had to abide by 
mandatory disclosure. Greenpeace found that none of these 25 factories 
disclosed environmental information within the required period of 30 
days. Four factories of three companies (Samsung, China Coal Energy 
and Weichai Power) disclosed their pollutant emissions (usually on the 
EPB websites), but only for a few of their discharged substances. Hence, 
an overall poor performance on environmental information disclosure, 
both for the Chinese and for the international companies. This is further 
confirmed by anecdotal evidence on individual cases, such as Green-
peace’s failed attempt to make BASF disclose its emission data (Kaiser 
and Liu 2009). Poor compliance with the EIDD by both national and 
international corporations is facilitated by weak enforcement of local 
EPBs and by confusion among companies regarding the category of 
“serious polluting enterprises” and the disclosure of information on 
“major pollutants”. 
The Institute for Public and Environmental Affairs (IPEA) has set 
up a database on water pollution and air pollution, with 9,000 records. In 
2009, using the EIDD, IPEA requested that 27 companies disclose their 
environmental discharge data. While 13 of them responded, only four of 
them actually released discharge data. No sanctions were used by EPBs 
to enforce disclosure of data (Wang and Ruan 2010). This poor perform-
ance in company environmental information disclosure forced the MEP 
to issue the “Notice on Strictly Implementing Environmental Protection 
Verification System in the Listed Companies and Strengthening Super-
vision Afterwards” on 13 July 2010. According to this notice, stock mar-
ket-listed companies are required to disclose environmental data, which 
need to be verified by the MEP and provincial EPBs, and these verifica-
tions are to be published every quarter. The notice requires the provin-
cial EPBs to take the stock market-listed companies as a priority target 
group for the enforcement of environmental information disclosure.  
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Discussion and Conclusion 
In comparing the various sources and studies on environmental infor-
mation disclosure by public and private organizations, it becomes clear 
that environmental information disclosure is not evenly distributed 
throughout China. Eastern and coastal provinces seem to score better in 
websites and online interactive communication functions than the west-
ern provinces, showing the differences in technical and financial capaci-
ties between rich and poor provinces. It should be noted, though, that 
most studies only evaluate the coverage of the information, not the 
quality of the provided information. Another clear difference between 
eastern and western provinces can be noted in reactive information dis-
closure: Among the five EPBs that received the highest number of in-
formation requests, four are from eastern China. And in our 2008 exper-
iment, five of the six provinces that provided adequate information 
(most of them in time) were rich eastern provinces. Wang and Ruan 
(2010) and IPEA and NDRC (2009, 2010) show that this is also valid for 
city-level (and sometimes even county-level) environmental protection 
departments, where major cities (and some counties) in Jiangsu and 
Zhejiang provinces are leading in publishing names of, environmental 
information about, and penalties leveled against heavy polluting enter-
prises on their websites. In a number of provinces (e.g. Hubei, Shan-
dong), city-level rather than provincial-level EPBs seem to lead in envir-
onmental disclosure reporting. But the suggested relationship that rich 
provinces are also the ones that lead in openness and information disclo-
sure is no iron law: Several rich eastern provinces did not respond to our 
request for information in 2008, including Hebei, Shandong and Guang-
dong, the latter of which also failed to respond in 2009. Also with re-
spect to company information disclosure, there is a certain correlation 
but no iron law between good information disclosure and rich, interna-
tional companies, as the Greenpeace (2009) study shows. Liu and 
Anbumozhi (2009) show that company size is a determinant of envir-
onmental information disclosure of Chinese companies but economic 
performance is not. Often it is governmental requirements rather than 
requirements from other stakeholders that make companies disclose 
environmental information. 
How should we interpret the ambivalent response to requests for 
information disclosure? From our interviews we learned that often lack 
of (motivated) staff and resources and the absence of clear responsibili-
ties are an important cause of information requests (sent by registered 
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mail, e-mail, fax, telephone or even online submission) ending up no-
where. And if these requests find a responsive EPB staff, it proves that 
they are often not able or not willing to respond to information disclo-
sure requests as stipulated by the decree. This was also the case in com-
pany environmental information disclosure. According to the 31 EPB 
staff members interviewed in both 2008 and 2010, the main reasons for 
not providing the requested information are that the information is ei-
ther nonexistent or classified as confidential. Although the information 
requested in our experiment is by no means confidential, confidentiality 
was quite often used as an excuse for withholding information on envir-
onmental accidents and industrial emissions. This ambiguous use of the 
confidentiality argument points on the one hand to conflicts between the 
decree and other laws and regulations – such as the Law on Guarding 
State Secrets, the Archives Law, the Administrative Procedural Law, the 
Law on the Prevention and Treatment of Infectious Diseases, and the 
Regulations on Preparedness for and Responses to Emergent Public 
Health Hazards – and, on the other hand, to the “attitudes” (cf. Liu 
2007) of the EPB officers involved. In addition to these arguments of 
confidentiality and inability, poor performance of environmental infor-
mation disclosure in companies and EPBs was also related to doubts 
about how certain clauses of the decree should be interpreted.  
These shortcomings in information disclosure could be interpreted 
as starting-up problems. But given the fact that all EPBs and companies 
had one year of preparation before the formal implementation of the 
decree on 1 May 2008, and given that the system has now been running 
for over two years, it seems there is more going on than just starting-up 
problems. Obviously, although the decree is meant to improve environ-
mental risk governance in China and strengthen civil society to become a 
partner in risk governance, the majority of EPBs and companies see it as 
a burden rather than a useful instrument. In general, insufficient re-
sources have been allocated to build up local capacity for implementa-
tion of disclosure systems, and no political priority is given to active or 
passive environmental information provision and disclosure. Under  
these conditions, the ambiguity of some clauses in the decree gives pro-
vincial environmental agencies great discretion to avoid disclosure and 
avoid enforcement of company environmental information disclosure.  
The implementation shortcomings of the EIDD can be partly inter-
preted as starting-up problems, but they are also related to the longstand-
ing reticence, secrecy and monopoly of information in China’s political 
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system. At the same time, the new legal provisions are also part of wider 
developments and practices in China to open up environmental infor-
mation systems to the public and make (environmental) authorities and 
companies more accountable in environmental risk management. Hence, 
we can expect that also in China environmental information disclosure 
will (slowly but steadily) be less and less understood in terms of a favour 
to the public, and more and more as an act and instrument of environ-
mental risk governance. To advance this, future efforts should focus on 
further publicity of the decree to enhance public participation, on the 
establishment of an evaluation and supervision system of information 
disclosure (Sun 2008), on the mobilization of resources within and across 
agencies, on the exchange of experiences and best practices among 
EPBs, on strengthening the legal status (also vis-à-vis other regulations) 
of environmental information disclosure, and on the enforcement of the 
decree's provision toward “serious polluting industries”. Only then will 
the promise of environmental information disclosure as a new environ-
mental risk management strategy materialize in China.  
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